Bus Franchising and Safety Transparency: What Authorities Are Admitting (and What They’re Not)

Over the past few months, I’ve been pursuing a series of Freedom of Information requests and formal correspondence with transport authorities across England to answer a simple question:

When bus services are franchised, how is safety data governed, reported, and made transparent to the public?

What I’ve uncovered so far is revealing — not because of what is being published, but because of what hasn’t yet been decided, even at an advanced stage of franchising.

What West Midlands Combined Authority Has Now Confirmed

Following direct correspondence with Transport for West Midlands (TfWM) — the transport arm of West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) — I’ve received a written response clarifying their current position on bus safety data under the franchising model.

WMCA has confirmed that:

• There is a commitment to routine public reporting of bus safety data under franchising

• However, no framework has yet been agreed for how this reporting will work

• There are no defined milestones setting out scope, frequency, or format

• There is no confirmed independent oversight mechanism

• There are no agreed confidential reporting arrangements (such as CIRAS)

• Stakeholder engagement, including with trade unions, has not yet commenced

In short: the intention exists, but the architecture does not.

Why This Matters

Safety transparency should not be an optional extra or something decided late in the process. Once contracts are procured and signed, the leverage to insist on openness, reporting standards, and independent oversight is significantly reduced.

By contrast, Transport for London has published bus safety data quarterly since 2014 — including collisions, injuries, and fatalities — without commercial harm to operators. The precedent already exists.

What’s concerning here is not bad faith, but delay and structural uncertainty.

WMCA has indicated that detailed work on safety governance has “not yet commenced” and that resources are still being allocated. Yet procurement is expected to begin later in 2026, with operations commencing in 2027.

That leaves a narrowing window to get this right.

A Wider Pattern Emerging

My FOI work with other authorities has revealed a recurring theme:

• Safety data is acknowledged as important

• Transparency is often promised in principle

• But the governance, publication standards, and accountability mechanisms are left undefined until very late

This creates risk:

Risk to public confidence

Risk to workforce trust

Risk of inconsistent or selective disclosure

Risk that safety reporting becomes contractual window-dressing rather than a living accountability tool

Why I’m Continuing to Push

This isn’t about scoring political points or opposing franchising.

It’s about ensuring that when public authorities take control of bus networks, they also take full, visible responsibility for safety outcomes — not just operational performance.

That means:

Clear safety reporting standards

Regular, public, routine publication

Independent oversight

Proper workforce engagement

Confidential reporting routes for drivers and staff

Transparency designed before procurement, not after

What Comes Next

I’ve now submitted parallel FOI requests to multiple local and combined authorities to establish:

What safety data they currently collect

How it is governed

Whether it is analysed

Whether publication is planned

Who is responsible for oversight

I’ll be cross-referencing those responses and returning to combined authorities — including EMCCA — once their statutory transport powers formally commence.

This blog will document that process.

Because safety transparency shouldn’t depend on persistence — it should be built into the system from day one.

Lee Odams

Bus worker | Safety campaigner | FOI requester

(Writing in a personal capacity)